Aggregator-oblivious encryption is a useful notion put forward by Shi et al. in 2011 that allows an untrusted aggregator to periodically compute an aggregate value over encrypted data contributed by a set of users. Such encryption schemes find numerous applications, particularly in the context of privacy-preserving smart metering.
INTRODUCTION
Since the introduction of electricity into the home, its use has been recorded by an electricity meter attached to the exterior of the home. However, this situation is gradually changing with the progressive deployment of smart meters [McDaniel and McLaughlin 2009] . In addition to the basic service offered by its predecessor, a smart meter comes with extra useful features aiming at reducing energy costs. For example, a smart meter can momentarily turn down high-energy electrical appliances during peak hours. For the utility company, one of its most appealing features is its ability to report the power consumption of their consumers in almost real time. This fine-grained information is helpful, as it allows the electricity provider to better adapt the load or forecast the supply. Moreover, it allows the electricity provider to quickly react when anomalies are detected on the grid. The resulting savings are also beneficial to the consumers, as they give rise to better pricing. But there is a downside. Frequent usage reports leak information about consumer habits and behaviors-e.g., when a certain consumer turns her TV on and what programs she is likely to watch. These seemingly unimportant issues should not be underestimated, as they may have unintended consequences from the inference of some private information (attributes or data).
In most cases, there is no need for the utility company (except for preparing the monthly bill) to get the fined-grained energy usage of each customer. For example, in the previous scenario, an aggregate suffices. The goal of this article is to mitigate the privacy issues that arise from smart metering by computing aggregates rather than individual energy consumption. More generally, we are seeking efficient privacypreserving methods for the aggregation of time-series data. The entity computing the aggregates is not necessarily trusted. We are interested in solutions that affect the existing infrastructure as little as possible. In particular, in the preceding scenario, we do not require smart meters to interact with each other nor the existence of a return channel. We note that the billing issue is separate. In practice, smart meters report their monthly energy consumption to the energy provider separately.
Related work. The preceding setting is the one considered in Shi et al. [2011] and Joye and Libert [2013] . Each smart meter encrypts its actual energy consumption and sends the result at regular intervals to an aggregator (which can be an entity different from the energy provider). In the case of electricity metering, a typical time period is 15 minutes. Upon receiving the encrypted values from a predetermined set of users, the aggregator combines the received values and from there deduces the total energy consumption over the population of these users for the current time period. This operation involves a secret key known only to the aggregator. Further, computing the sum over the predetermined set of users is the only operation the aggregator can perform-it cannot learn anything beyond what is revealed by the aggregate value. Following Shi et al. [2011] , such a scheme is termed an aggregator-oblivious encryption scheme.
Like Shi et al. [2011] and Joye and Libert [2013] , all of our schemes can serve as a building block for the fault-tolerant solution of Chan et al. [2012] while enjoying the benefits of our construction. In fact, all extensions of Shi et al. [2011] are also possible with our system. In particular, although the focus of this article is on the encryption, the proposed schemes are compatible with the differential privacy framework [Dwork 2008; Dwork et al. 2006] . In this case, the smart meters simply need to add some appropriately generated noise to their data prior to encryption. Two other protocols in settings similar to the one of aggregator-oblivious encryption are the low-overhead protocol of Kursawe et al. [2011] and the protocol ofÁcs and Castelluccia [2011] . However, these protocols have the drawback of requiring each smart meter to store as many keys as there are users, which can be impractical for a large set of smart meters.
We also note that recent results on multi-input functional encryption [Goldwasser et al. 2014] imply noninteractive constructions of aggregator-oblivious encryption. However, due to their inevitable use of indistinguishability obfuscation candidates [Garg et al. 2013] , they are really far from being practical and should only be seen as feasibility results.
Many other settings than the one we consider have been studied in the literature. For example, the protocol of Dwork et al. [2006] allows the aggregation of more complex functions but requires communication between the smart meters. The settings of Rastogi and Nath [2010] and Garcia and Jacobs [2010] require bidirectional channels between the smart meters and the aggregator, whereas we only require a unidirectional channel from each smart meter to the aggregator. The protocols of Leontiadis 
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Note: For T = n = 2 20 , based on ECRYPT 2 recommendations, s −1 (α) is the minimal number of bits of a modulus that cannot be factored in time 2 α ; see Section 3.3 for details.
et al. [2014] and suppose the existence of an additional semitrusted party who cannot collude with the aggregator. In addition, in , the smart meter should be able to receive data from this third party. For more information on aggregation schemes, we refer the reader to the detailed survey of .
Our contributions. Although applicable to our framework, the solutions offered in Shi et al. [2011] and Joye and Libert [2013] are not fully satisfying, but for different reasons. Table I gives a rough idea of the expected gains for our basic aggregator-oblivious encryption scheme (a more detailed analysis with concrete implementation numbers is provided in Section 3).
Joye-Libert's scheme supports large plaintext spaces and a large number of users. However, as it is built over Paillier's encryption scheme, the involved parameters are somewhat large. Back to our example of smart meters, this in turn implies that these are likely equipped with cryptoprocessors for modular arithmetic over large integers and possess sufficient memory for storing intermediate computations. Larger ciphertexts also mean more bandwidth for their transmission. Shi et al.'s scheme provides a cheaper solution, as it is ElGamal-based and relies on the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption. In particular, it can be implemented using elliptic-curve groups with much shorter parameters. It requires the computed aggregated sum to lie in a relatively small predetermined set. In the case of smart meters, this does not really constitute a limitation for most practical settings, as the sum should be less than 30 bits long.
A reductionist security proof of a cryptographic scheme consists of an efficient algorithm, called a reduction, that uses an attacker against the scheme as a subroutine to solve a problem supposed hard. If ε and ε respectively denote the success probability of the attacker and of the reduction algorithm, the security proof is said tight when ε ≈ ε and loose otherwise. The tightness gap is measured by the ratio ε/ε and captures the security loss. This ratio is an important parameter, as it defines the exact security [Bellare and Rogaway 1996; Bellare 2005 ] of a scheme. It quantifies the amount by which the security parameters defining the scheme need to be increased to accommodate the tightness gap.
But as already pointed out in Joye and Libert [2013] , one drawback of Shi et al. [2011] is that the security reduction from the underlying complexity assumption is very loose. If the scheme is set up for n users and if the number of time periods is at most T , there is a multiplicative gap of O(T n 3 ) between the adversary's advantage and the reduction's probability to solve the DDH problem. Moreover, using a metareduction, we show in Appendix C that a degradation factor of at least (n 2 ) is unavoidable in the scheme of Shi et al. [2011] .
An important contribution of this article is a new DDH-based aggregator oblivious encryption scheme (see Section 3) with a much tighter security reduction. Whereas the security loss is O(T n 3 ) in Shi et al.'s scheme, our basic scheme reduces this gap to roughly O(T ) in the worst-case scenario (this worst-case scenario is illustrated by the figures given in Table I) .
In Section 4, we generalize our basic DDH-based construction. We propose a generic framework for the privacy-preserving aggregation of time-series data featuring a tighter reduction. This framework is based on smooth projective hash functions (SPHFs) [Cramer and Shoup 2002] with an extra additively homomorphic property over the key space. Note that all SPHF realizations given in Cramer and Shoup [2002] are natively additively key homomorphic. As shown in Section 5, our framework encompasses our basic scheme and a variation of Joye-Libert's scheme. Several other aggregator-oblivious encryption schemes based on a variety of complexity assumptions are presented in Section 5. This clearly demonstrates the generic aspect of our framework.
AGGREGATOR-OBLIVIOUS ENCRYPTION
We review the definition of aggregator-oblivious (secret-key) encryption and then proceed with the corresponding security notion. We refer the reader to Shi et al. [2011] for further introductory background.
Definition 2.1. An aggregator-oblivious encryption scheme is a tuple of three algorithms, (Setup, Enc, AggrDec), defined as follows:
On input a security parameter λ, a trusted dealer generates the system parameters param, the aggregator's private key sk 0 , and the private key sk i for each user i (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Enc(param, sk i , τ, x i,τ ). At time period τ , user i encrypts a value x i,τ using her private encryption key sk i to get c i,τ = Enc(param, sk i , τ, x i,τ ). AggrDec(param, sk 0 , τ, c 1,τ , . . . , c n,τ ). At time period τ , the aggregator using sk 0 obtains
. M is some fixed integer contained in the system parameters param.
This definition slightly generalizes the definition introduced in Shi et al. [2011] . We make explicit the fact that the sum is computed modulo some integer M. To compute sums over the integers, it is sufficient to choose M greater than the maximal possible sum, as done in the constructions of Shi et al. [2011] . Furthermore, we note that some constructions assume that AggrDec only works on a small subset of {0, . . . , M − 1}.
Aggregator Obliviousness
Basically, the security notion of aggregator obliviousness (AO) requires that the aggregator cannot learn, for each time period, anything more than the aggregate value X τ from the encrypted values of n (honest) users. If there are corrupted users (i.e., users sharing their private information with the aggregator), the notion only requires that the aggregator gets no extra information about the values of the honest users beyond their aggregate value. Further, it is assumed that each user encrypts only one value per time period.
More formally, AO is defined by the following game between a challenger and an attacker:
Setup. The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and gives param to the attacker. Queries. In a first phase, the attacker can submit queries that are answered by the challenger. The attacker can make two types of queries:
(1) Encryption queries: The attacker submits tuples (i, τ, x i,τ ) for a pair (i, τ ) and gets back the encryption of x i,τ under key sk i for time period τ . (2) Compromise queries: The attacker submits i and receives the private key sk i of user i; if i = 0, the attacker receives the private key of the aggregator.
Challenge. In a second phase, the attacker chooses a time period τ . Let U ⊆ {1, . . . , n} be the whole set of users for which, at the end of the game, no encryption queries have been made on time period τ and no compromise queries have been made. The attacker chooses a subset S ⊆ U and two different series of triples
that are given to the challenger. Further, if the aggregator capability sk 0 is compromised at the end of the game and S = U , it is required that
Guess. The challenger chooses uniformly at random a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and returns the encryption of x (b) i,τ i∈S to the attacker. More queries. The attacker can make more encryption and compromise queries. Note that since S ⊆ U , the attacker cannot submit an encryption query (i, τ , ·) with i ∈ S or a compromise query i with i ∈ S . Outcome. At the end of the game, the attacker outputs a bit b and wins the game if and only if b = b.
Definition 2.2. An encryption scheme is said to meet the AO security notion if no probabilistic polynomial-time attacker can guess correctly, in the preceding game, the bit b with a probability nonnegligibly better (in the security parameter) than 1/2. Formally, an encryption scheme is AO secure if the advantage of any probabilistic polynomial-time attacker A defined as
is negligible; the probability is taken over the random coins of the game according to the distribution induced by Setup and over the random coins of the attacker.
Existing Schemes
So far, there are two known constructions of aggregator-oblivious encryption schemes. They both meet the AO security notion in the random oracle model. The first one is due to Shi et al. [2011] and works in DDH groups. The second construction, due to Joye and Libert [2013] , relies on the composite residuosity assumption [Paillier 1999 ]. These two schemes are reviewed in Appendix A.
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A NEW DDH BASED SCHEME
As mentioned earlier, the security proof offered in Shi et al. [2011] incurs an O(T n 3 ) degradation factor. The scheme in Joye and Libert [2013] avoids this degradation factor; namely, the multiplicative gap between the adversary's maximal advantage and the probability to break the underlying complexity assumption is only proportional to the number q enc of encryption queries made by the adversary for distinct time periods other than τ (so that q enc < T ). In this section, we introduce an aggregator-oblivious encryption scheme enjoying a security reduction as tight as in Joye and Libert [2013] but based on the DDH assumption. The main advantage is that the resulting ciphertexts are much shorter.
Basic Scheme
We base the security of our basic scheme on the standard DDH assumption.
Definition 3.1. Let G be a group of prime order p. The decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem in G is to distinguish among the following two distributions:
The DDH assumption states that the advantage of a polynomial-time distinguisher A, defined as
is negligible.
We are now ready to present the scheme. It is given by the following tuple of algorithms:
. Let G be a group of prime order M = p for which the DDH assumption holds, and let g ∈ G be a random generator. In addition, let H 1 : Z → G and H 2 : Z → G be two hash functions. Finally, for 2n random elements
The system parameters are param = {p, G, g, H 1 , H 2 }, and the secret key of user
next the discrete logarithm of V τ with respect to basis g.
As for the Shi et al. construction, since g has order p, the sum X τ is computed modulo M = p. Further, in the AggrDec algorithm, the aggregator has to obtain the value of
The most appropriate method for computing discrete logarithms is Pollard's λ algorithm (or variants thereof) and requires that the range of X τ be relatively small.
Security
The next theorem proves that the basic scheme meets the aggregator-oblivious security notion in the random oracle model, based on the DDH assumption. 
where q enc is the number of encryption queries made by the adversary for distinct time periods other than τ and e is the base for the natural logarithm.
PROOF. The theorem is a corollary of Theorem 4.3, which ensures the security of our abstract scheme (see Section 4.4).
Performance
The new scheme combines the advantages of Joye and Libert [2013] (which offers tighter security in the random oracle model) and Shi et al. [2011] (which has more compact ciphertexts when implemented using elliptic-curve groups). As already shown in Table I (Section 1), our basic scheme represents the aggregator-oblivious encryption with the shortest ciphertexts. The key sizes are derived from the ECRYPT 2 recommendations [ECRYPT II 2012] , where Shi et al.'s scheme and our basic scheme are implemented in elliptic-curve groups and Joye-Libert's scheme in Z * N 2 with N an RSA modulus. Concretely, for a security gap of 2 γ , key sizes are chosen such that the underlying problem (DDH for Shi et al.'s scheme and our scheme, or decision composite residuosity (DCR) for the Joye-Libert scheme) cannot be solved in time 2 γ +λ (with constant probability, e.g., 1/2). According to ECRYPT 2 recommendations, for a DDH-based scheme, the order of the group used has to have 2(γ + λ) bits, whereas for a DCR-based scheme, the modulus has to have s −1 (γ + λ) bits, where s is the function defined in ECRYPT II [2012, Section 6.2.1]. As the latter function is sublinear, higher security levels yield better results for our basic scheme compared to Joye and Libert [2013] .
As exemplified in Table II , our new scheme also features better encryption times. This table present the running times for a security level of 80 bits and was constructed from a synthetically generated dataset by taking n = 2 20 ≈ 10 6 users and T = 2 20 time periods. This approximately allows computing an aggregation every 15 minutes for 30 years over a city like Paris (there are about one million households in Paris). Moreover, to have the fairest possible comparison, the worst case for our reduction is considered: q enc = T − 1 ≈ 2 20 . Higher security levels yield better results for our basic scheme compared to Joye and Libert [2013] , as attacks against factorization and DCR are subexponential in the key size, whereas attacks against DDH are exponential in the key size.
GENERALIZATION USING KEY-HOMOMORPHIC SMOOTH PROJECTIVE HASH FUNCTIONS
In this section, we use the framework of key-homomorphic smooth projective hashing to generalize our DDH construction presented in Section 3. Note: For T = n = 2 20 , 80-bit security, using parameters in Table I 
Key-Homomorphic Smooth Projective Hash Functions
4.1.1. Subset-Membership Problem. We start with the important notion of subsetmembership problems, as introduced in Cramer and Shoup [2002] . Consider an NPlanguage L ⊂ X , defined by a polynomial-time witness relation R:
We suppose that L, X ,L = X \ L are efficiently (uniformly) samplable, and even that sampling a word y ∈ L along with an associated witness w for this word can also be done efficiently. We also assume that |L|/|X | is negligible: in other words, a random element of X is inL with overwhelming probability.
Basically, the language L induces a hard subset-membership problem if random elements of L cannot be distinguished from random elements of X . More formally, this notion can be defined via the following game between a challenger and an attacker. Defining the subset-membership hardness via the preceding game allows us to generically obtain tighter security bounds. In instantiations based on specific assumptions (e.g., DDH), the random self-reducibility of underlying problems (e.g., Abadi et al. [1989] , Stadler [1996] , and Naor and Reingold [1997] ) allows avoiding any dependency on q m in the reduction. Cramer and Shoup [2002] as a tool to construct chosen-ciphertext secure encryption schemes. Next, we present a variant tailored to fulfill our needs. A recent account on the different flavors of SPHFs can be found in Benhamouda et al. [2013] .
Smooth Projective Hash Functions. SPHFs were introduced by
Definition 4.2. Using the previous notations, a smooth projective hash function (SPHF) is specified by a tuple of algorithms, (HashKG, ProjKG, Hash, ProjHash), of which the first one is probabilistic and the other algorithms are deterministic, defined as follows:
On input a security parameter λ, algorithm HashKG generates a hashing key hk identified as an element of K, where K denotes the key space. ProjKG(hk). Given a hashing key hk, this algorithm derives a projection key hp. Hash(hk, y). Given a hashing key hk and a word y ∈ X , algorithm Hash outputs the hash value h of y. ProjHash (hp, y, w) . Given a projection key hp, a word y ∈ L, and a corresponding witness w (such that R(y, w) = 1), algorithm ProjHash outputs the hash value h of y.
Further, letting denote the range of Hash and ProjHash and assuming that ( , ·) is an Abelian group (written multiplicatively with 1 as neutral element), an SPHF must satisfy the properties of correctness and special smoothness:
Correctness. This property means that Hash and ProjHash hash to the same value for any word y in the language L. More precisely, for every hashing key hk
, for all y ∈ L, and associated witness w (such that R(y, w) = 1), we have
⊆ be a subset of . Intuitively, the special smoothness says that the hash value of any y ∈L = X \ L looks random "over ," even knowing hp. Formally, an SPHF is said to be (ε s , )-smooth if for all y ∈L, the following two distributions are ε s -statistically indistinguishable:
There are a couple of differences compared to the definition given in Cramer and Shoup [2002] . Special smoothness replaces the original smoothness property. The latter basically corresponds to the definition of special smoothness when = . The special smoothness is also required to hold for any word y ∈L, not just on average as in the original definition. Furthermore, only HashKG and Hash are required to be polynomialtime algorithms; ProjKG or ProjHash are not required to be efficient, and they may run in exponential time.
An additional property that will be used in the security proofs is called key uniformity.
Key uniformity. An SPHF is ε hk -key uniform when an honestly generated hashing key is ε hk -statistically indistinguishable 2 from a random element in K. 
(3) for any two hashing keys hk 1 , hk 2 ∈ K and for every word y ∈ X Hash(hk 1 + hk 2 , y) = Hash(hk 1 , y) · Hash(hk 2 , y).
Our Abstract Scheme
We can now present our generic aggregator-oblivious encryption scheme, based on key-uniform, key-homomorphic SPHF with the special smoothness property. Let f be an injective group homomorphism, f : Z M → . We assume that this homomorphism is efficiently and publicly invertible over the domain of possible sums X τ (which may be smaller than {0, . . . , M−1}, as is the case for our DDH-based scheme).
. Let L ⊂ X be a hard subset-membership language. In addition, let H : Z → X be a hash function (viewed as a random oracle in the security analysis). 
AggrDec(param, sk 0 , τ, c 1,τ , . . . , c n,τ ). The aggregator obtains the sum X τ (mod M) for time period τ by computing
. The correctness of the aggregation step follows from the homomorphic properties,
Security
We prove security of the abstract scheme in the random oracle model based on the hardness of the subset-membership problem. 
where n is the number of users, q enc is the number of encryption queries made by the adversary for distinct time periods other than τ , and e is the base for the natural logarithm.
We recall that we suppose |L|/|X | is negligible.
PROOF. The proof proceeds with a sequence of several games. It begins with Game 0, which is the real game, and ends with Game 6, where even a computationally unbounded adversary has no advantage. For each j ∈ {0, . . . , 6}, we denote by S j the event that the challenger B outputs 1 in Game j. 3 We also define Adv j = 2 · |Pr[
In the following, we assume without loss of generality that the adversary A has always already queried the random oracle H on input τ before any encryption query for the time period τ . We assume that the adversary does not query the random oracle H more than once for a given τ .
Game 0. This is the real game. Namely, the challenger performs the setup of the system by generating hk 1 , . . . , hk n using HashKG and defining hk 0 = − n i=1 hk i . Queries to the random oracle H are answered by returning uniformly random group elements in X . Encryption queries (i, τ, x i,τ ) for time period τ are answered by returning the ciphertext c i,τ = f (x i,τ ) · h i,τ with h i,τ = Hash(hk i , H(τ )). Whenever the adversary decides to corrupt some player i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, the challenger reveals hk i . In the challenge phase, the adversary chooses a target time period τ , an uncorrupted subset S ⊆ U , and two distinct series (i, τ ,
i,τ ) i∈S that must sum up to the same value if S = U and the aggregator's private key sk 0 is exposed at some point of the game (see Section 2.1). At this stage, the challenger flips a fair binary coin b R ← {0, 1}, and the adversary A receives
We assume that the adversary queries H(τ ) before the challenge phase. Otherwise, B can simply make the query for itself. In the second phase, after a second series of queries, A outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. We let the challenger B output 1 if b = b and 0 otherwise. The adversary's advantage in Game 0 is thus
Game 1. This game is identical to Game 0 with the following difference. For each random oracle query H(τ ), the challenger B flips a biased coin δ τ ∈ {0, 1} that takes the value 1 with probability 1/(q enc + 1) and the value 0 with probability q enc /(q enc + 1). At the end of the game, B considers the event E that one of the following conditions holds:
-For the target time period τ , the coin δ τ flipped for the hash query H(τ ) was δ τ = 0. -There exists a time period τ = τ such that an encryption query (i, τ, .) was made for some user i ∈ U but for which δ τ = 1.
If event E occurs (which B can detect at the end of the game), B halts and outputs a random bit. Otherwise, it outputs 1 if and only if b = b. An analysis similar to that in Coron [2000] shows that
, where e is the base for the natural logarithm. The transition from Game 0 to Game 1 is thus a transition based on a failure event of large probability [Dent 2006 ], and we therefore have Adv 1 = Adv 0 · Pr[¬E] ≥ Adv 0 /(e(q enc + 1)).
Game 2. In this game, we modify the distribution of random oracle outputs. Specifically, the treatment of each hash query τ depends on the random coin δ τ ∈ {0, 1}:
-If δ τ = 0, the challenger B samples a random word y τ ∈ L together with a witness w τ and defines H(τ ) = y τ ; -If δ τ = 1, B samples a word y τ ∈ X and defines H(τ ) = y τ .
It is straightforward to see that Game 2 and Game 1 are computationally indistinguishable if the hard subset-membership assumption holds. Namely, there exists a distinguisher B memb for the subset-membership problem of L with comparable running time and such that
Game 3. In this game, after the challenge query, if H(τ ) = y τ ∈ L, then B halts and outputs a random bit. We recall that in the previous game, y τ was drawn uniformly at random from X (or B would already have stopped because of event E). (1) i,τ , the set U \ S cannot be empty, so the previous definition makes sense. If event E occurs (which B can detect at the end of the game), B halts and outputs a random bit. Otherwise, it outputs 1 if and only if b = b. As for the transition from Game 0 to Game 1, the transition from Game 4 to Game 5 is a transition based on a failure event of large probability. We therefore have Adv 5 = Adv 4 · Pr[¬E ] = Adv 4 /(n + 1).
Game 6. In this game, B picks hk i independently and uniformly at random in K, for i ∈ {0, . . . , n} \ {i }, and computes hk i = − i∈{0,...,n}\{i } hk i at the beginning of the game. For any time period τ , B computes h i ,τ as i∈{0,...,n}\{i } (h i,τ ) −1 . Furthermore, for any i ∈ U \ {i } and any time period τ = τ , B now computes h i,τ as ProjHash(hp i , y τ , w τ ) (with w τ a witness for y τ ∈ L), instead of Hash(hk i , y τ ). Game 6 is perfectly indistinguishable from Game 5 (thanks to the fact that hk 0 , . . . , hk n are, in both games, all chosen uniformly at random under the only condition that -if i∈S x
for i ∈ S \{i } ⊆ U \{i }, and we have that for any sequence (h i ) i∈S , there exists a unique sequence (h i ) i∈S (with i∈S h i = i∈S h i = 1) that satisfies
It is therefore clear that Pr [S 7 ] = 1/2, so A has no advantage (Adv 7 = 0). In addition, Games 6 and 7 are statistically indistinguishable thanks to the special smoothness of the SPHF: |Pr[S 7 ] − Pr [S 6 ]| ≤ n ε s and so Adv 6 ≤ Adv 7 + 2n ε s .
Putting it all together, we get
which concludes the proof.
A Concrete Instantiation
An example of hard subset-membership language is the DDH language. We then have
where g 1 and g 2 are two generators of a group G of prime order p. The hard subsetmembership assumption for this language is the DDH assumption. For the DDH language, Cramer and Shoup construct an SPHF as follows. The key space is K = Z p × Z p , and the hash range is = G. The hashing key is a random tuple hk = (s, t) ∈ K, and the projection key is hp = g 1 s g 2 t . We then have
and if w is a witness for (y 1 , y 2 ), i.e., y 1 = g 1 w and y 2 = g 2 w ,
This SPHF is (0, )-smooth (see Cramer and Shoup [2002] ). It is readily seen that this SPHF is key homomorphic and 0-key uniform. If we set f :
(where g is a generator of G), which clearly is an injective group homomorphism, we exactly get our DDH-based scheme of Section 3. Observe also that plugging ε hk = ε s = 0, |X | = p 2 , and |L| = p in Theorem 4.3 yields the statement of Theorem 3.2. Escala et al. [2013] generalize the k-LIN assumptions [Boneh et al. 2004; Hofheinz and Kiltz 2007; Shacham 2007] in an assumption referred to as MDDH. They also show how to construct an SPHF from any MDDH assumption. Their construction can be used directly in our framework, with f (x) = g x (which is invertible for x in small ranges), since their SPHFs are clearly key homomorphic and 0-key uniform. This yields in particular an aggregator oblivious encryption scheme from the k-LIN assumption.
FURTHER INSTANTIATIONS

k-Linear Assumption and Generalizations
When k = 1, since 1-LIN = DDH, we get exactly the new scheme presented in Section 3. A larger value of k implies a weaker assumption: indeed, the k-LIN assumption is implied by the (k − 1)-LIN assumption for any k > 1, as shown in Hofheinz and Kiltz [2007] and Shacham [2007] . The disadvantage of a larger k is an increase of the privatekey size, which has to be multiplied by (k + 1)/2. However, other parameter sizes given in Table I remain unchanged. In particular, increasing k does not affect the ciphertext size, which is unusual for encryption schemes based on the k-LIN assumption.
Subgroup Decision Assumption
Yet another instantiation can be derived from the subgroup decision (SD) assumption (for cyclic groups of composite order, without pairing) as introduced by Boneh et al. [2005] .
Let N = pq be an RSA modulus with p and q two large primes. Let G = g be a cyclic group of order N, G p = g p be the subgroup of order p, and G q = g q be the subgroup of order q.
Then, set the following:
-for any y ∈ X , Hash(hk, y) = y r , and for any y ∈ L, ProjHash(hp, y, w) = hp w with w a witness for y such that y = g p w , for hk = r
The so-obtained SPHF is (0, )-smooth, 0-key uniform, and key homomorphic.
DCR Assumption
The DCR assumption of Paillier [1999] can also be used to instantiate a slight variant of our general framework. The resulting aggregator-oblivious encryption scheme shares many similarities with the Joye-Libert's construction in Joye and Libert [2013] , but it is not strictly the same scheme. We rely on a variant of the hash proof system proposed by Cramer and Shoup [2002] , with inefficient ProjKG and ProjHash. Let N = pq be an RSA modulus where p and q are two distinct primes. Define
and set -for any y ∈ X , Hash(hk, y) = y r , and for any y ∈ L, ProjHash(hp, y, ⊥) = y hp , where the hashing key is chosen as hk = r R ← {−2 κ N 2 , . . . , 2 κ N 2 } (with κ depending on the expected security-see the following) and hp = r mod φ(N)-since φ(N) is unknown (otherwise, the language is not hard subset membership), note that hp cannot be efficiently computed;
If we set K = Z Nφ(N) and identify hashing keys hk ∈ {−2 κ N 2 , . . . , 2 κ N 2 } as elements of K, the resulting SPHF is clearly key homomorphic. Furthermore, r mod Nφ(N) is 1/2 κ+1 -statistically close from the uniform distribution over K. Since if r R ← K would lead to a (0, )-smooth SPHF, the actual resulting SPHF is (1/2 κ+1 , )-smooth. As shown in Appendix B, the corresponding scheme provably meets the notion of AO. We have the following theorem. where n is the number of users, q enc is the number of encryption queries made by the adversary for distinct time periods other than τ , and e is the base for the natural logarithm.
APPENDIX
A. AGGREGATOR-OBLIVIOUS ENCRYPTION SCHEMES
For completeness, we review the two known constructions for aggregator-oblivious encryption [Shi et al. 2011; Joye and Libert 2013] .
A.1. Shi et al.'s Scheme
Setup(1 λ ). Let G be a group of prime order p for which the DDH assumption holds, and let a random generator g ∈ G. In addition, let H : Z → G be a hash function viewed as a random oracle. Finally, let n random elements in Z p , s 1 , . . . , s n , and define
The system parameters are param = {G, g, H}, and the secret key of user i,
AggrDec ( Enc(param, sk i , τ, x i,τ ). At time period τ , for a private input x i,τ ∈ Z N , user i produces
AggrDec(param, sk 0 , τ, c 1,τ , . . . , c n,τ ). The aggregator obtains the sum X τ for time period τ by first computing
, the so-obtained value for X τ is defined modulo M = N.)
B. DEFERRED PROOF OF OUR DCR INSTANTIATION
The proof of our DCR instantiation in Section 5.3 (Theorem 5.1) is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.3 but not exactly the same, since the scheme is not key uniform (as hashing keys have multiple representations), and hk 0 is the opposite of the sum of the hk i over the integers and not in the group K = Z Nφ (N) .
Again, we do a proof by games. We use the same first four games: Game 0 to Game 3. Then, as the SPHF is not key uniform, we just skip Game 4 and go directly to Game 5 (except now, in this game, we suppose that hk
hk i over the integers). The problem is that when i = 0, it is no more true that Game 6 is indistinguishable from Game 5: B cannot pick hk i independently and uniformly at random in K (or even in {−2 κ N 2 , . . . , 2 κ N 2 }), for i ∈ {0, . . . , n} \ {i } and cannot compute hk i as − i∈{0,...,n}\{i } hk i , because hk 0 is not uniform in K nor in {−2 κ N 2 , . . . , 2 κ N 2 }, as it is the sum of the hk i over the integers.
We remark, however, that if i = 0, the adversary never sees hk 0 , and if in Game 6 B picks hk i independently and uniformly at random in {−2 κ N 2 , . . . , 2 κ N 2 }, for i ∈ {0, . . . , n} \ {i } and computes hk i = hk 0 as − i∈{0,...,n}\{i } hk i over the integers, then the proof still works and Adv 5 ≤ Adv 6 + 2nε s ≤ n/2 κ .
We now focus on the difficult case i = 0. We use the following Game 6: B picks hk 1 , . . . , hk n uniformly at random in {−2 κ N 2 , . . . , 2 κ N 2 } and set hk 0 = − i∈{1,...,n} hk i over the integers (as in Game 5). However, as in the original Game 6 and contrary to Game 5, B computes h i ,τ as i∈{0,...,n}\{i } h −1 i,τ (which is perfectly indistinguishable). Furthermore, for any i ∈ S \{i }, B computes h i,τ as Hash(hk i , y τ ), with hk i a random hashing key in K corresponding to the same projection key hp i as hk i , or in other words,
but hk i mod N and hk i mod N are independent (and uniformly random). We remark
could also be computed as (in the case of the SPHF that we consider):
Therefore, Game 6 (in this proof) is actually similar to Game 7 in the original proof, and A has no advantage in this game: Adv 6 = 0.
To conclude the proof, we just need to prove that Game 6 is statistically indistinguishable from Game 5. We suppose without loss of generality that S \ {i } = {1, . . . , m }, where m = m < n if i / ∈ S and m = m − 1 < n otherwise. We also suppose that i = n. We first remark that for any i ∈ S \ {i } and for any time period τ = τ , H i,τ can be computed from hp i = hk i mod φ(N) and hk i is only used to compute hk 0 . Define the following probability distributions (for j = 0, . . . , m):
When all of these variables are drawn from distribution D 0 , we get Game 5, whereas when they are drawn from distribution D m , we get Game 6.
To do that, we use the following lemma.
LEMMA B.1. Let M, N , N be three integers, with M ≥ N N and N 
We have that X , X, Y are mutually independent, so 
Moreover, we have 
Thus, the statistical distance satisfies
This concludes the proof of the lemma.
We use the lemma with M = 2 κ N 2 , N = N, and N = φ(N). For any integers x ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1} and x ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}, let us denote by x = CRT(x , x ) the unique integer x ∈ {0, . . . , N N − 1} such that x mod N = x and x mod N = x . Then, in D j−1 , we remark that hk j , hp j , hk j , hk n , and hk 0 can alternatively be defined as
whereas in D j , these random variables can alternatively be defined as
Back to the theorem, thanks to Lemma B.1, we can conclude that D j−1 and D j are (N + 1)N /(2(2M + 1))-close, and the statistical distance between D 0 and D n is at most
Therefore, Adv 5 ≤ Adv 6 + n/2 κ .
C. IMPOSSIBILITY RESULT OF TIGHTNESS FOR A PREVIOUS SCHEME
We now show that any blackbox nonrewinding reduction from the AO of the scheme in Shi et al. [2011] to a noninteractive problem loses a factor of at least n 2 . This bound cannot be improved in the Shi et al.'s scheme. This impossibility result is shown by outlining a metareduction (i.e., a reduction against the reduction) as in Coron [2002] . The idea is to show that any reduction losing a factor better than (about) n 2 can be converted into an adversary for the original hard problem by constructing an adversary B that acts as an adversary for the reduction but that can also rewind the reduction. The basic idea is that in the scheme of Shi et al., sk i is completely defined (from the information theory viewpoint) when a ciphertext c i,1 for 0 (for example) is given; and sk 0 is defined by (c i,1 ) i∈{1,. ..,n} .
More precisely, suppose that the reduction can solve the original hard problem with probability ε R when playing with any adversary breaking the AO with advantage 2ε A − 1. We construct an adversary B (which has the right to rewind the reduction) as follows. B will first ask for the aggregator secret key sk 0 and for ciphertexts c i,1 of 0 for time period 1 (and for each user i). It can check that any secret key sk i given by the reduction is valid or not (for each user i), with respect to c i,1 (by checking that Enc(param, sk i , 1, 0) = c i,τ ) and that sk 0 is valid (by checking that AggrDec (param, sk 0 , 1, c 1,1 , . . . , c n,1 ) = 0). Then it will choose two random users i 1 = i 2 . For all pairs of distinct users {i 3 , i 4 } = {i 1 , i 2 }, it then asks all secret keys sk i (in an arbitrary order) except i 3 and i 4 , stores them, and then rewinds the adversary just after the corruption of sk 0 -B therefore rewinds the reduction (n − 1)(n − 2)/2 times (one for each pair {i 3 , i 4 } = {i 1 , i 2 }). After that, B will have stored (n − 1)(n − 2)/2 keys sk i 1 and (n− 1)(n− 2)/2 keys sk i 2 . If any of them are invalid, B aborts and returns b = 0 with probability 1/2 and b = 1 otherwise.
Otherwise, B then asks all secret keys sk i except for i 1 and i 2 . If none of them are valid, B aborts and returns b = 0 with probability 1/2 and b = 1 otherwise. Otherwise, it just submits the challenge: S = {i 1 , i 2 }, τ = 2, (x We remark that if sk i 1 or sk i 2 is valid, B would behave exactly as an all powerful (non-polynomially bounded) adversary A that would do the same as B, except it does not perform any rewinding (and so never corrupts sk i 1 and sk i 2 ), and instead computes sk i 1 and sk i 2 simply by trying all possible values. This is true thanks to the check with sk 0 , which ensures that if c i 1 ,2 is an encryption of 0 (respectively, 1), then c i 2 ,2 is an encryption of 1 (respectively, 0), and so knowing only one of sk i 1 and sk i 2 is sufficient. In addition, if any sk i for some i / ∈ {i 1 , i 2 } (obtained after the last rewinding for B) is not valid, both A and B abort. Therefore, A and B behave identically, except if all secret keys sk i (for i / ∈ {i 1 , i 2 }) are valid (after the last rewinding for B) but B cannot find a valid key sk i 1 or a valid key sk i 2 among all keys it got from all of the rewindings. We call a bad case the case where the previous bad event happens and let ε bad be the probability of this event.
The advantage of A (to break the AO) is exactly Adv A = 2ε A − 1, since when A plays against the real challenger for the AO, A never aborts, and the bit b computed by A is always equal to b, the bit chosen in the game, and hence b = b with probability ε A . In the bad case, B outputs b = b with probability 1/2 instead of ε A for A, whereas outside the bad case, B and A output b = b with the same probability. Therefore, when playing with B, the reduction solves the original hard problem with probability at least This has to be negligible, as otherwise the hard problem would not be hard. Therefore, ε R or Adv R cannot be larger than ε bad · Adv A /2 or ε bad · Adv A (minus some negligible factor in the security parameter). We just need to prove that ε bad ≥ 2/(n(n− 1)) to show our impossibility result.
For that purpose, for any integers j 1 and j 2 , let E j 1 , j 2 denote the event that, when the secret keys sk i for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ { j 1 , j 2 } are corrupted, the secret keys given by the reduction are all valid. We clearly have
since if E i 3 ,i 4 is true for some {i 3 , i 4 } = {i 1 , i 2 } (i 3 = i 4 ), then i 1 / ∈ {i 3 , i 4 } or i 2 / ∈ {i 3 , i 4 }, and we get a valid secret key sk i 1 or sk i 2 . If we fix everything except the choice of i 1 and i 2 , each event E i 3 ,i 4 is either satisfied (it has probability 1) or not satisfied (it has probability 0). If two distinct events E i 5 ,i 6 and E i 5 ,i 6 are satisfied, the event {i 3 ,i 4 } ={i 1 ,i 2 } ¬E i 3 ,i 4 never happens and ε bad = 0. If no event is satisfied, the event E i 1 ,i 2 never happens and ε bad = 0. Finally, if only one event E i 5 ,i 6 is satisfied, E i 1 ,i 2 ∧ ( {i 3 ,i 4 } ={i 1 ,i 2 } ¬E i 3 ,i 4 ) happens only when {i 1 , i 2 } = {i 5 , i 6 }, which happens with probability 2/(n(n − 1)). Therefore, ε bad ≤ 2/(n(n − 1)).
